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Abstract
A recursive regression methodology is used to analyze the bubble characteristics of various
ﬁnancial time series during the subprime crisis. The methods provide a technology for identi-
fying bubble behavior and consistent dating of their origination and collapse. Seven relevant
ﬁnancial series are investigated, including three ﬁnancial assets (the Nasdaq index, home price
index and asset-backed commercial paper), two commodities (the crude oil price and platinum
price), one bond rate (Baa), and one exchange rate (Pound/USD). Statistically signiﬁcant bub-
ble characteristics are found in all of these series. The empirical estimates of the origination
and collapse dates suggest an interesting migration mechanism among the ﬁnancial variables: a
bubble ﬁrst emerged in the equity market during mid-1995 lasting to the end of 2000, followed
by a bubble in the real estate market between January 2001 and July 2007 and in the mort-
gage market between November 2005 and August 2007. After the subprime crisis erupted, the
phenomenon migrated selectively into the commodity market and the foreign exchange market,
creating bubbles which subsequently burst at the end of 2008, just as the eﬀects on the real
economy and economic growth became manifest. Our empirical estimates of the origination
and collapse dates support strongly the general features of the scenario of this crisis put forward
in a recent study by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008).
Keywords: Financial bubbles, Crashes, Date stamping, Explosive behavior, Mildly explosive
process, Subprime crisis, Timeline.
JEL classification: C15, G12
There is a very real danger, fellow citizens, that the Icelandic economy in the
worst case could be sucked into the whirlpool, and the result could be national
bankruptcy (Prime Minister Geir Haarde, televised address to Icelandic Nation,
October 8, 2008)
Iceland goes bankrupt. That’s a clear sign that the global financial crisis is
entering a new and vastly more dangerous phase. (Michael Mandel, Business Week,
October 10, 2008)
Between 40 and 45 percent of the world’s wealth has been destroyed in little less
than a year and a half. (Stephen Schwarzman, March 11, 2009)
1 Introduction
Financial bubbles have been a longstanding topic of interest for economists, involving both
theorists and empirical researchers. Some of the main issues have focused on mechanisms
for modeling bubbles, reconciling bubble-like behavior in the context of rational expectations
of future earnings, mechanisms for detecting bubbles, and measuring their extent, exploring
causes and the psychology of investor behavior, and considering suitable policy responses.
While there is general agreement that ﬁnancial bubbles give rise to misallocation of resources
and can have serious eﬀects on real economic activity, as yet there has been little consensus
among economists and policy makers on how to address the many issues raised above.
The global ﬁnancial turmoil over 2008-2009, triggered by the subprime crisis in the US
and its subsequent eﬀect on commodity markets, exchange rates and real economic activity,
has led to renewed interest among economists in ﬁnancial bubbles and their potential global
consequences. There is now widespread recognition among policy makers as well as economists
that changes in the global economy over the last decade, far from decoupling economic activity
as was earlier believed, have led to powerful latent ﬁnancial linkages that have increased risks
in the event of a large common shock. The magnitude of the crisis is so large, the mechanism
so complex, and the consequences so important to the real economy that understanding the
phenomena, exploring its causes and mapping its evolution have presented major challenges to
the economics profession. As the headers that lead this article indicate, a substantial percentage
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of the world’s accrued wealth has been destroyed within 18 months of the subprime crisis with
manifold eﬀects ranging from the collapse of major ﬁnancial institutions to the near bankruptcy
of national economies.
The recent background of ﬁnancial exuberance and collapse with concatenating eﬀects
across markets and nations provides a rich new environment for empirical research. The most
urgent ongoing questions relate to matters of ﬁscal, monetary, and regulatory policies for se-
curing ﬁnancial stability and buttressing real economic activity. In this regard, there have been
serious disagreements among economists and policy makers about the eﬀectiveness and con-
sequences of various bailout and recovery plans proposed by North American, European and
Asian governments to deal with the ﬁnancial crisis. Beyond these immediate policy issues are
underlying questions relating to the emergence of the phenomena and its evolutionary course
through the ﬁnancial and economic systems. It is these latter issues that form the focus of
interest of the present paper.
The subprime crisis is not an isolated empirical event. In a recent article, Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2008a, CFG hereafter) argued that the Internet bubble in the 1990s, the asset
bubbles over 2005-2006, the subprime crisis in 2007, and the commodity bubbles of 2008 are
all closely related. Similar views of the interconnectedness of the crisis phenomena are held by
most economists and media commentators and this interpretation is also generally supported
by the timeline in which the various crisis events have unfolded. CFG go further and put
forward a sequential hypothesis concerning bubble creation and collapse that accounts for the
course of the ﬁnancial turmoil in the U.S. economy using a simple general equilibrium model
without monetary factors but with goods that may be partially securitized. Date stamping
the timeline of the origination and collapse of the various bubbles is a critical element in the
validity of this sequential hypothesis and may be empirically tested.
The present paper provides such a test. We use new econometric methodology to test
if and when bubbles emerged and collapsed in the stock market, the real estate market, the
mortgage market, the commodity market, and the foreign exchange market over the period
surrounding the subprime crisis. Many series are studied. In particular, we investigate the
bubble characteristics in the Nasdaq index over February 1973 to January 2009, the U.S. house
price index over January 1987 to January 2009, outstanding asset backed commercial paper
2
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Figure 1: Time series plots of real prices for three ﬁnancial assets: monthly observations on the
Nasdaq index from February 1973 to January 2009; monthly observations on the house price
index from January 1987 to January 2009; monthly observations on the outstanding value of
asset backed commercial paper from January 2001 to January 2009. All series are normalized
by the CPI. The estimated bubble origination and collapse dates are also shown on the ﬁgures.
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(ABCP) over January 2001 to January 2009, the price of crude oil over January 1999 to January
2009, platinum prices over January 1999 to January 2009, Baa bond rates over January 3, 2006
to January 30, 2009, and Pound/USD exchange rates over March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009.
Figs. 1-3 show the time series plot of the ﬁrst three, next two, and last two series, respectively.
Our methods enable us to determine whether a bubble emerged in each series, date stamp the
origination in that event, and correspondingly assess whether the bubble collapsed and the
date of that collapse. The empirical date stamps so determined are then matched against the
hypothesized sequence of events described in the model of CFG.
The econometric methods used here were ﬁrst proposed in Phillips, Wu and Yu (2009,
PWY hereafter). The methods rely on forward recursive regressions coupled with sequential
right-sided unit root tests. The sequential tests assess period by period evidence for unit root
behavior against mildly explosive alternatives. Mildly explosive behavior may be modeled by
an autoregressive process with a root (ρ) that exceeds unity but that is still in the general
vicinity of unity. Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a, 2007b, PM hereafter) show that this ‘mildly
explosive’ vicinity of unity can be successfully modeled in terms of deviations of the form
ρ − 1 = c/kn > 0, where c is a positive constant and kn is a sequence that passes to inﬁnity
with, but more slowly than, the sample size n, so that ρ→ 1. These processes therefore involve
only mild departures from strict (rational) martingale behavior in markets. They include
submartingale processes of the type that have been used to model rational bubble behavior in
ﬁnance (Evans, 1991; Campbell, Lo and McKinley, 1998). PM (2007a, 2007b) have investigated
this class of process, developed a large sample asymptotic theory, and shown that these models
are amenable to econometric inference, unlike purely explosive processes for which no central
limit theory is applicable.
PWY applied forward recursive regression methods to Nasdaq stock prices during the 1990s,
and using sequential tests against mildly explosive alternatives were able to date-stamp the
origination of ﬁnancial exuberance in the Nasdaq market to mid-1995, prior to the famous
remark of Alan Greenspan in December 1996 about irrational exuberance in ﬁnancial markets.
This test therefore revealed that there was anticipatory empirical evidence supporting mildly
explosive behavior in stock prices over a year prior to Greenspan’s remarks. In ongoing work,
Phillips and Yu (2009) have developed a limit theory for this date stamping technology and
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Figure 2: Time series plots of real prices for two commodities: monthly observations of crude
oil prices and monthly observations of platinum prices, both from January 1999 to January
2009. Both series are normalized by the CPI. The estimated bubble origination and collapse
dates are also shown on the ﬁgures.
checked the ﬁnite sample capability of this procedure to identify and date bubble behavior.
The date stamp estimators were shown to be consistent for the origination and collapse of
bubble behavior and the dating mechanism was shown to work well in ﬁnite samples.
The present paper uses this methodology to explore the sequential pattern of events of
the current ﬁnancial crisis. Dating helps to characterize the phenomena by identifying the
individual events and by ﬁxing their extent and sequencing. It may be viewed as a ﬁrst step in
understanding the phenomena and in searching for causes of the behavioral changes involved
in bubble origination and collapse. Date stamping also assists in evaluating hypotheses about
the concatenation of bubble activity over time and across markets, such as those developed in
CFG. The forward recursive regression approach used here enables early identiﬁcation of the
appearance of mildly explosive behavior in asset prices, thereby providing anticipatory evidence
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Figure 3: Time series plots of two ﬁnancial variable: daily observations of Baa bond rates from
January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009 and weekly observations of Pound/USD exchange rates
from March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009. The estimated bubble origination and collapse dates
are also shown on the ﬁgures.
of a (local) move away from martingale behavior. Similarly, the approach helps to identify a
subsequent switch back to martingale behavior as explosive sentiment collapses.
Empirical evidence of emergent mildly explosive behavior is found in many of the time series
studied here, and in all of the series (except for the Pound/USD exchange rate) manifesting
mildly explosive behavior there is further evidence of subsequent collapse. Figs. 1-3 show
the origination and collapse dates for the bubbles identiﬁed in the seven ﬁnancial time series
mentioned earlier. For the three series depicted in Fig. 1, the bubbles emerged and collapsed
prior to the subprime crisis. For the two series depicted in Fig. 2 and the two series depicted
in Fig. 3, the bubbles all emerged after the subprime crisis. These ﬁndings reveal a sequence
of mildly explosive events each followed by a ﬁnancial collapse that corroborates the sequential
hypothesis given in CFG. Consideration of a wider group of related ﬁnancial series following
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the eruption of the subprime crisis indicates that bubbles of the type found in the series in
Figs. 2-3 are not always evident in other commodities or currencies. Accordingly, the empirical
evidence supports a selective migration of the bubble activity through ﬁnancial markets as the
subprime crisis evolved and liquid funds searched for safe havens.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the econometric methodology for
dating bubble characteristics, discusses rational bubble and variable discount rate sources of
ﬁnancial exuberance, outlines some of the relevant facts concerning the subprime crisis, and
relates the timeline implications of the theoretical results obtained in CFG (2008a). Section 3
describes the data that is used in the present empirical study. Section 4 sets up the hypotheses
that embody the bubble migration mechanism, presents the empirical ﬁndings, and matches
the estimates to the theory of CFG (2008a). Section 5 concludes.
2 Bubbles, the Subprime Crisis, and Econometric Dating
2.1 Bubbles and Crashes
In the popular press, the term “ﬁnancial bubble” refers to a situation where the price of a
ﬁnancial asset rapidly increases and does so in a speculative manner that is distinct from what
is considered to be the asset’s intrinsic value. The term carries the innuendo that the increase
is not justiﬁed by economic fundamentals and that there is, accordingly, risk of a subsequent
collapse in which the asset price falls precipitously. In such cases, the bubble phenomenon is
typically conﬁrmed in retrospect.
A common deﬁnition that makes this usage precise is that bubble conditions arise when
the price of an asset signiﬁcantly exceeds the fundamental value that is determined by the
discounted expected value of the cash ﬂows that ownership of the asset can generate. However,
discount rates may be variable and, as demonstrated below, the time proﬁle of the discount
rate can have important eﬀects on the characteristics of the fundamental price and may even
propagate explosive price behavior.
An important secondary characteristic of the bubble phenomenon is that during both the
run up and run down periods the asset is subject to high volume trading in which the direction
of change is widely anticipated (and relied upon), as distinct from normal market conditions in
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which the asset price follows a near martingale. It is this deviation from martingale behavior
that provides a mechanism for identifying both the emergence of the boom phase of a bubble
behavior and its subsequent crash.
This distinction is recognized in the rational bubble literature, which characterizes the boom
phase of a bubble in terms of explosive dynamics or submartingale behavior. This property
contrasts with the eﬃcient market martingale property, which implies unit root time series
dynamic behavior. To explain the diﬀerence in terms of the commonly used present value
model, let Pt be the stock price at time t before the dividend payout, Dt be the dividend
payoﬀ from the asset at time t, and r be the discount rate (r > 0). The standard no arbitrage
condition implies that
Pt =
1
1 + r
Et(Pt+1 + Dt+1), (1)
and recursive substitution yields
Pt = Ft +Bt, (2)
where Ft =
∞∑
i=1
(1 + r)−iEt(Dt+i) and
Et(Bt+1) = (1 + r)Bt. (3)
Hence, the asset price is decomposed into two components, a “fundamental” component, Ft,
that is determined by expected future dividends, and a supplementary solution corresponding
to the “bubble” component, Bt. In the absence of bubble conditions, Pt = Ft. Otherwise,
Pt = Ft+Bt and price embodies the explosive component Bt, which satisﬁes the submartingale
property (3). Consequently, under bubble conditions, Pt will manifest the explosive behavior
inherent in Bt. This explosive property is very diﬀerent from the random wandering (or unit
root) behavior that is present in Ft when Dt is a martingale and that is commonly found for
asset prices in the empirical literature.
Over long periods of time, some asset prices like equities also tend to manifest empirical
evidence of a drift component. Unit root time series with a drift can generate periods of run-
up if the variance of the martingale component is small and the drift is strong enough. But
accumulated gains in such cases are at most of O(n) for sample size n. In practice, of course,
the drift component is usually small and is generally negligible over short periods, so the unit
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root behavior is the dominant characteristic and clear evidence of gains only shows up over long
horizons. On the other hand, the run up rate in an explosive process is O((1 + r)n) for some
r > 0, as in (3), and is therefore much greater. This diﬀerence between linear and exponential
growth combined with the nonlinear curvature in an explosive process are testable properties
distinguishing the two processes. In terms of model (1) and its solution (2), both Bt and Pt
increase rapidly during the boom phase of the bubble according to Et(Bt+h) = (1 + r)hBt
and the initialization B0 > 0. But when the bubble conditions collapse and the particular
solution disappears, Pt = Ft which corresponds to a sudden collapse in the asset price. If the
dividend process Dt follows a martingale, reﬂecting market conditions generating cash ﬂows,
then Ft is similarly a martingale and is cointegrated with Dt. Under such conditions, the
presence of an additional “rational bubble” submartingale component Bt in Pt can account for
an explosive-type run up in the asset price Pt.
Explosiveness in Bt and hence in Pt suggests that Pt is predictable during an explosive
period. While this may be at odds with the eﬃcient market hypothesis, the predictability in
stock returns at short horizons is consistent with what has been documented in the recent em-
pirical literature – see, for example, Ang and Bekaert (2006). At longer horizons, explosiveness
is subject to collapse, generating a (long run) martingale like feature in the price and making
returns more diﬃcult to predict. This latter ﬁnding is also empirically documented in Ang and
Bekaert (2006).
Importantly, making the discount factor rt time-varying (and either stationary or integrated
of order one) does not change qualitatively our analysis because the implications for the sta-
tistical properties of Ft, Bt and Pt are the same as with the constant r. For example, if rt is
stationary, (3) becomes
Et(Bt+1) = (1 + rt)Bt. (4)
Then, if (3) is ﬁtted, r =
(
ΠTt=1(1 + rt)
)1/T
> 1, implying an explosive process for Bt and hence
Pt, even if Ft itself is not explosive.
2.2 The Eﬀects of a Time Varying Discount Rate
This paper interprets explosiveness in price as suﬃcient evidence for bubbles and this interpre-
tation holds true under a varieties of assumptions on the discount rate. As indicated above,
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Time
rts
rD  1tb−t
rD  ca  2tb−t
rD
t tb t  s
Figure 4: Time Path of the Discount Rate rt+s in (9).
certain time proﬁles for the discount rate can have an important eﬀect on the characteristics of
the fundamental price. The present section illustrates this possibility by developing a simple
propagating mechanism for explosive behavior in the fundamental price under a time varying
discount rate.
If dividends grow at a constant rate rD with rD < r in (1),1 the fundamental value of the
stock price
Ft =
Dt
r − rD . (5)
This is the well-known Gordon growth model. It is evident that in this case the fundamental
value can be very sensitive to changes in r when r is close to rD. In fact, the fundamental value
diverges as r ↘ rD, so that a price run-up is evidently possible under certain time proﬁles for
1This assumption obviously violates the assumption we adopted earlier, namely, constancy, stationarity or
integration of order 1.
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the discount rate. This simple Gordon model reveals the potential impact of a time varying
discount rate, but it provides no price dynamics. The following argument provides an analytic
formulation that shows how an explosive time path in fundamental values can be generated by
time variation in the discount rate.
Consider a continuous time version of (5) with time varying discount rate rt, viz.,
Ft =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−srt+s)EtDt+sds. (6)
Suppose dividends have a constant expected growth rate rD such that
EtDt+s = exp(rDs)Dt, (7)
and then Dt is a martingale when rD = 0. Combining (6) and (7)
Ft =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−s(rt+s − rD))Dtds. (8)
Given some ﬁxed time point tb, constants ca > 0 and λ1 > λ2 > 0, let the time proﬁle of the
discount rate rt+s for t ∈ (0, tb] be as follows:
rt+s =
{
rD + tb−t−ss ca +
λ1
s for 0 ≤ s < tb − t
rD + ca + λ2s for s ≥ tb − t
. (9)
Then, the discount rate decreases towards some level rD + λ1tb−t as t+ s↗ tb and jumps to the
level rD + ca + λ2tb−t immediately thereafter, as shown in Fig. 4. Thus, the time proﬁle of the
discount factor has a structural break at tb in which a higher rate of discounting occurs at tb.
The break itself widens asymptotically as t↗ tb.
We then have
Ft/Dt =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−s(rt+s − rD))ds
=
∫ tb−t
0
exp(−ca(tb − t− s)− λ1)ds+
∫ ∞
tb−t
exp(−cas− λ2)ds
= e−λ1
[
e−ca(tb−t−s)
ca
]tb−t
0
+ e−λ2
[
e−cas
−ca
]∞
tb−t
=
e−λ1
ca
[
1− e−ca(tb−t)
]
+
e−λ2
ca
e−ca(tb−t)
=
e−λ1
ca
+
(
e−λ2 − e−λ1)
ca
e−ca(tb−t) := σt,
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and the time path of Ft/Dt is explosive over t ∈ (0, tb]. Over this interval, Ft evolves according
to the diﬀerential equation
dFt =
(
e−λ2 − e−λ1
)
e−ca(tb−t)Dtdt + σtdDt.
Since caFt/Dt = e−λ1 +
(
e−λ2 − e−λ1) e−ca(tb−t), we have
dFt =
(
e−λ2 − e−λ1) e−ca(tb−t)
e−λ1 + (e−λ2 − e−λ1) e−ca(tb−t) caFtdt + σtdDt, for t ∈ (0, tb].
For t close to tb the generating mechanism for Ft is approximately
dFt =
(
e−λ2 − e−λ1)
e−λ1 + (e−λ2 − e−λ1)caFtdt + σtdDt
=
{
1− e−(λ1−λ2)
}
caFtdt + σtdDt,
which is an explosive diﬀusion because
cb =
{
1− e−(λ1−λ2)
}
ca > 0,
since ca > 0 and e−(λ1−λ2) < 1. The discrete time path of Ft in this neighbourhood is therefore
propagated by an explosive autoregressive process with coeﬃcient ρ = ecb > 1.
The heuristic explanation of this behavior is as follows. As t ↗ tb there is growing antici-
pation that the discount factor will soon increase. Under such conditions, investors anticipate
the present to become more important in valuing assets. This anticipation in turn leads to
an inﬂation of current valuations and price fundamentals Ft become explosive as this process
continues.
On the other hand, for t > tb we have
rt+s = rD + ca + λ2s for s > 0 ,
and then
Ft/Dt =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−s(rt+s − rD))ds
=
∫ ∞
0
exp(−cas− λ2)ds
= e−λ2
[
e−cas
−ca
]∞
0
=
e−λ2
ca
.
12
So, Ft = e
−λ2
ca
Dt for t > tb and price fundamentals are collinear with Dt. When Dt is a Brownian
motion or an integrated process in discrete time, Ft and Dt are cointegrated. Thus, after time
tb, price fundamentals comove with Dt.
It follows that the time proﬁle (9) for the discount rate rt induces a subinterval of explosive
behavior in Ft before tb. In this deterministic setting, it is known as time tb approaches that
there will be an upwards shift in the discount factor that makes present valuations more impor-
tant. A more realistic model might allow for uncertainty in this time proﬁle and a stochastic
trajectory for rt that accommodated potential upwards shifts of this type.
Econometric dating procedures of the type described below may be used to assess evidence
for subperiods of explosive price behavior that are induced by such time variation in the discount
factor, just as for other potential sources of ﬁnancial exuberance.
2.3 Subprime Crisis and Event Timeline
The subprime mortgage crisis is generally regarded as an important triggering element in the
ongoing global ﬁnancial crisis. The subprime event began with a dramatic rise in mortgage
delinquencies and foreclosures starting in late 2006 in the US, as easy initial adjustment rate
mortgage terms began to expire and reﬁnancing became more diﬃcult at the same time as
house prices were falling. The event had wider and, soon, global consequences because of the
huge scale of mortgage backed securities (MBS) in the ﬁnancial system, extending the impact of
mortgage failure to the asset positions of investment and commercial banks. The crisis became
apparent in the last week of July 2007 when German bank regulators and government oﬃcials
organized a $5 billion bail out of IKB, a small bank in Germany. We may therefore treat the
beginning of August 2007 as the public onset date of the subprime crisis, although the realities
in terms of rising mortgage delinquencies commenced earlier.
Much has already been written about the causes of this crisis and a host of factors have been
suggested, including poor appreciation of the risks associated with MBS, weak underwriting
standards and risk assessment practices in general, increasingly complex ﬁnancial products,
high levels of ﬁnancial leverage with associated vulnerabilities, shortfalls in understanding the
impact of large common shocks on the ﬁnancial system, and inadequate monitoring by policy
makers and regulators of the accumulating risk exposure in the ﬁnancial markets. We refer
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readers to Brunnermeier (2008), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) and Hull (2008)
for detailed discussions of the subprime crisis and its manifold implications. Our concern in
the present paper is with the crisis timeline and, more speciﬁcally, the issues of empirically
dating the origination and collapse of the various ﬁnancial bubbles that occurred as the crisis
events unfolded.
Prior to the subprime crisis and following the collapse in dot-com stocks in 2000-2001, the
housing market in many states of the US sustained rapid increases in valuations fueled by a
period of low interest rates, large foreign capital inﬂows, and high-risk lending practices of
ﬁnancial institutions. In the resulting boom, home ownership in the US increased to 69.2% in
2004 from 64% in 1994 (Callis and Cavanaugh, 2007) and norminal house prices increased by
more than 180% over the period 1997-2006 (Panel 2 in Fig. 1). Household debt, as a percent-
age of disposable income, increased from 77% to 127% over the period 1990-2007 (Economist,
November 22, 2008). At the same time, the MBS market, derived from residential mortgages,
mushroomed, and major banks and ﬁnancial institutions around the world invested in secu-
rities that were ultimately founded on the U.S. housing market. For example, the norminal
outstanding amount of asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) increased by more than 80%
over the period July 2004 to July 2007 (See Panel 3 of Fig. 1).
The concatenation of events that occured after the housing market peaked in 2005 and went
into decline, followed by the subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent repercussions on ﬁnancial
institutions over 2007-2008 and ﬁnally the impact on world trade and real economic activity, is
now well known. Securities backed by subprime mortgages lost most of their value, investors lost
conﬁdence, and liquidity dried up as money ﬂowed to assets which appeared to have inherently
lower risk, such as Treasury bonds, and to other assets like commodities, and currencies such
as the U.S. dollar and the Japanese Yen (mainly through the unwinding of the carry trade
industry), generating a so-called ﬂight-to-quality. In consequence, commodity prices soared,
some currencies like the U.S. dollar appreciated, while others like the British pound rapidly
declined. As the crisis deepened, stock markets around the world fell, and commercial banks,
mortgage lenders and insurance companies failed. Consumption and investment expenditures
dropped, many OECD economies went into serious recession, export driven economies in Asia
sustained double digit percentage declines in exports, growth slowed signiﬁcantly in China,
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and world trade declined. Concomitant with these real economic eﬀects, global demand for
commodities declined and commodity prices fell.
In a recent study, CFG (2008a) proposed a model which seeks to explain the main features
of this sequence of complex interlinked ﬁnancial crises. The CFG model links together global
ﬁnancial asset scarcity, global imbalances, the real estate bubble, the subprime crisis, and the
commodity bubble in a general equilibrium macroeconomic environment without monetary
factors. The model is based on CFG (2008b) and assumes that the economy has two countries
(U and M) and features two goods (X and Z). A key part of the CFG framework is a sequence
of hypotheses involving successive bubble creations and collapses, which we brieﬂy review as
follows.
Country U is interpreted as the U.S. and country M as the emerging market economies and
commodity producers. Good X is a non-storable good, a fraction of which can be capitalized,
and is produced by both countries. Good Z is a storable commodity and is produced only
by country M . A presumption in the model is that there exists a global imbalance at period
t0. The imbalance can be interpreted as arising from continuing capital ﬂows from emerging
markets to the U.S. as the U.S. runs a growing trade deﬁcit with emergent economies, which
in turn rely more heavily on export driven growth.
In order to allow country U to have both a large current account deﬁcit and low interest
rates, a fundamental assumption that CFG makes is that a bubble developed initially in country
U. In practical terms, this may be viewed as a bubble in the equity, housing and mortgage
markets in the U.S., the latter providing ﬁnancial assets that oﬀer suﬃcient rewards to be
attractive to the rest of the world. Another fundamental assumption is that the bubble bursts
at t = 0, leaving investors (both locals and foreigners) to look for alternative stores of value. In
the ﬁrst stage, a ﬂight-to-quality reaction migrates the bubble to “good” assets and so the price
of commodities (notably, Z) jumps, which results in a signiﬁcant wealth transfer from U to M .
In the second stage, under the assumption that the ﬁnancial asset crisis and wealth transfer
precipitates a severe growth slowdown, the excess demand for the “good” asset is destroyed,
leading to a decrease in inventory of the good Z, and the bubble in commodity prices collapses.
Accordingly, this model can describe events in which asset bubbles emerged and subse-
quently collapsed creating a sequence of bubble eﬀects in one market after another. When the
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real estate bubble crashed and the value of MBS securities fell substantially, liquidity ﬂowed
into other markets creating bubbles in commodities and oil markets as investors transferred
ﬁnancial assets. The deepening ﬁnancial crisis then sharply slowed down economic growth,
which in turn destroyed the commodity bubbles. Obviously, this story makes strong predic-
tions concerning the timing of the origination and the collapse of various bubble phenomena
in diﬀerent markets. To evaluate the evidence in support of such interpretations of the events,
consistent date stamping of those events is critical.
2.4 Econometric Dating of the Timeline
Bubbles can be definitively identified only in hindsight after a market correction
(Economist, June 18, 2005)
The time path of Pt in the rational bubble model (with bubble component Bt) is explosive.
Similarly, in the run-up phase of a ﬁnancial bubble, a pattern of stochastically explosive or
mildly explosive behavior is a characteristic feature. The econometric determination of bubble
behavior therefore relies on a test procedure having power to discriminate between unit root (or
martingale like) local behavior in a process and mildly explosive stochastic alternatives. The
same distinction in reverse is required during a bubble collapse. Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a,
2007b, hereafter PM) analyzed the properties of mildly explosive stochastic processes and
developed a limit theory for autoregressive coeﬃcient estimation and inference in that context.
That machinery was used in PWY (2009) and forms the technical basis of the procedures
applied in the present application.
PWY (2009) used forward recursive regression techniques and PM asymptotics to test
for the presence of mildly explosive behavior in 1990s Nasdaq data and to date stamp the
origination and collapse of the Nasdaq bubble. We use the same methodology here, combined
with the limit theory in Phillips and Yu (2009) which establishes consistency of the dating
estimators. The key idea is simple to implement and relies on recursively calculated right-sided
unit root tests to assess evidence for mildly explosive behavior in the data. In particular,
for time series {Xt}nt=1, we apply standard unit root tests (such as the coeﬃcient test or the
Dickey-Fuller t test) with usual unit root asymptotics under the null against the alternative of
an explosive or mildly explosive root. The test is a right-sided test and therefore diﬀers from
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the usual left-sided tests for stationarity. Contrary to the quotation that heads this section, it
is possible by means of these tests to identify the emergence of mildly explosive behavior as it
occurs, thereby presaging bubble conditions. It is not necessary to wait for a market correction
to identify bubble conditions in hindsight.
More speciﬁcally, we estimate the following autoregressive speciﬁcation by recursive least
squares
Xt = μ + δXt−1 + εt, εt ∼ iid (0, σ2), (10)
allowing for the fact that the iid assumption may be relaxed with the usual (possibly semi-
parametric) adjustments to the tests. The null hypothesis is H0 : δ = 1 and the right-tailed
alternative hypothesis is H1 : δ > 1, which allows for mildly explosive autoregressions with
δ = 1 + c/kn, where kn →∞ and kn/n→ 0.
The regression in the ﬁrst recursion uses τ0 = [nr0] observations, for some fraction r0 of
the total sample where [·] denotes the integer part of its argument. Subsequent regressions
employ this originating data set supplemented by successive observations giving a sample of
size τ = [nr] for r0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Denote the corresponding coeﬃcient test statistic and the Dickey-
Fuller t statistic by DF δr and DF
t
r , namely,
DF δr := τ
(
δˆτ (τ)− 1
)
, DF tr :=
(∑τ
j=1 X˜
2
j−1
σˆ2τ
)1/2 (
δˆτ (τ)− 1
)
, (11)
where δˆτ is the least squares estimate of δ based on the ﬁrst τ = [nr] observations, σˆ2τ is
the corresponding estimate of σ2, and X˜j−1 = Xj−1 − τ−1
∑τ
j=1 Xj−1. Obviously, DF
δ
1 and
DF t1 correspond to the full sample test statistics. Under the null hypothesis of pure unit root
dynamics and using standard weak convergence methods (Phillips, 1987), we have the following
limit theory as τ = [nr]→∞ for all r ∈ [r0, 1]
DF δr ⇒
∫ 1
0 W˜dW∫ 1
0 W˜
2
, DF tr ⇒
∫ 1
0 W˜dW(∫ 1
0 W˜
2
)1/2 , (12)
where W is standard Brownian motion and W˜ (r) = W (r) − ∫ 10 W is demeaned Brownian
motion.
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If Model (10) is the true data generating process for all t, then recursive regressions are
unnecessary. In this case, a right-sided unit root test based on the full sample is able to dis-
tinguish a unit root null from an explosive alternative. In practice, of course, empirical bubble
characteristics are much more complicated than model (10) and involve some regime change(s)
between unit root (martingale) behavior with δ = 1 and mildly explosive behavior with δ > 1
and potential re-initialization as market temperature shifts from normal to exuberant senti-
ment and back again. A distinguishing empirical feature of bubble behavior is that market
correction typically occurs as sentiment reverts back and mildly explosive behavior collapses.
A model to capture this type of reversion was ﬁrst constructed by Evans (1991) who argued
that conventional unit root tests had little power in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles
generated in this manner. As shown in Phillips and Yu (2009), such a model which mixes a
unit root process with a collapsed explosive process actually behaves like a unit root process
over the full sample (in fact, with some bias toward stationarity as explained below), thereby
invalidating the standard unit root test as a discriminating criterion when it is applied to the
full sample.
To ﬁnd evidence for the presence of a bubble in the full sample, PWY (2009) suggest using
a sup statistic based on the recursive regression. This involves comparing supr DF tr with the
right tailed critical values from the limit distribution based on supr∈[r0,1]
∫ r
0 W˜dW/
(∫ r
0 W˜
2
)1/2
.
Similarly, for the coeﬃcient test, one can compare the sup statistic supr DF δr with the right
tailed critical values from the limit distribution based on supr∈[r0,1]
∫ r
0 W˜dW/
∫ r
0 W˜
2.
Our approach to ﬁnding the timeline of the bubble dynamics also makes use of forward
recursive regressions. We date the origination of the bubble by the estimate τˆe = [nrˆe] , where
rˆe = inf
s≥r0
{
s : DF δs > cv
δ
βn
}
, or rˆe = inf
s≥r0
{
s : DF ts > cv
df
βn
}
, (13)
and cvδβn (cv
df
βn
) is the right-side 100βn% critical value of the limit distribution of the DF δr (DF
t
r )
statistic based on τs = [ns] observations, and βn is the size of the one-sided test. Conditional
on ﬁnding some originating date rˆe for (mildly) explosive behavior, we date the collapse of the
bubble by τˆf = [nrˆf ] , where
rˆf = inf
s≥rˆe+ log(n)n
{
s : DF δs < cv
δ
βn
}
, or rˆf = inf
s≥rˆe+ log(n)n
{
s : DF ts < cv
df
βn
}
. (14)
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This dating rule for τˆf requires that the duration of the bubble is nonnegligible – at least a small
inﬁnity as measured by log n, so that episodes of smaller order than log n are not considered
signiﬁcant in the dating algorithm for τf . This requirement helps to reduce the type I error in
the unit root test without aﬀecting the consistency property of the estimator.
The consistent estimation of re and rf requires a slow divergence rate of critical values.
For practical implementation, we set the critical value sequences
{
cvδβn , cv
df
βn
}
according to an
expansion rule such as cvδβn = (log log
2 [nr])/2 and cvdfβn = (log log
2 [nr])/4. Both these critical
values diverge at a slowly varying rate with cvdfβn < cv
δ
βn
. For practically reasonable sample
sizes, these critical values are close to the 1% critical values for DF δ1 and DF
t
1. For example,
when n = 100, cvδβn = (log log
2 n)/2 = 1.17 and cvdfβn = (log log
2 n)/4 = 0.58. The 1% critical
values for DF δ1 and DF
t
1 are 1.14 and 0.63, respectively. These critical value expansion rates
have been trialed in extensive simulations in Phillips and Yu (2009) and found to give very
satisfactory results in terms of small size and high discriminatory power.
Under the mildly explosive bubble model,
Xt = Xt−11 {t < τe}+ δnXt−11 {τe ≤ t ≤ τf} (15)
+
⎛⎝ t∑
k=τf+1
εk + X∗τf
⎞⎠ 1 {t > τf}+ εt 1 {t ≤ τf}
δn = 1 +
c
nα
, c > 0, α ∈ (0, 1) ,
Phillips and Yu (2009) showed that rˆe
p→ re and rˆf p→ rf under some general regularity
conditions. Model (15) mixes together two processes, a unit root process and a mildly explosive
process with a root above 1 taking the form δn = 1+ cnα . This type of mildly explosive process
over τe ≤ t ≤ τf was originally proposed and analyzed by PM (2007a, 2007b). However, the
above system is more complex because it involves regime switches from unit root to mildly
explosive behavior at τe and from the mildly explosive root back to a unit root at τf . At τf ,
the switch also involves a re-initialization of the process and Xt collapses to X∗τf , corresponding
to a bubble collapse back to fundamental values prevailing prior to the emergence of the bubble.
We may, for instance, set X∗τf = Xτe +X
∗ for some Op (1) random quantity X∗, so that X∗τf is
within an Op (1) realization of the pre-bubble value of Xt.
Under this model speciﬁcation (15), Phillips and Yu (2009) showed that when τ = [nr] ∈
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[τe, τf ),
DF δr = τ
(
δˆn (τ)− 1
)
= n1−αrc + op (1)→ +∞,
and
DF tr =
(∑τ
j=1 X˜
2
j−1
σˆ2τ
)1/2 (
δˆn (τ)− 1
)
= n1−α/2
c3/2r3/2
21/2r1/2e
{1 + op (1)} → +∞.
Hence, provided cvδβn goes to inﬁnity at a slower rate than n
1−α and cvdfβn (r) goes to inﬁnity
at a slower rate than n1−α/2, DF δr and DF tr both consistently estimate re. Moreover, when
τ = [nr] > τf ,
DF δr = τ
(
δˆn (τ)− 1
)
= −n1−αrc→ −∞, (16)
and
DF tr =
(∑τ
j=1 X˜
2
j−1
σˆ2τ
)1/2 (
δˆn (τ)− 1
)
= −n(1+α)/2 c
1/2r1/2
21/2
{1 + op (1)} → −∞. (17)
Hence, DF δr and DF
t
r both consistently estimate rf .. Importantly, (16) diverges to negative
inﬁnity, so it is apparent that in the post bubble period τ > τf the autoregressive coeﬃcient
δˆn (τ) is biased downwards, which in this case means biased towards stationarity. This bias is
explained by the fact that the collapse of the bubble produces a mean reverting eﬀect in the
data, which manifests in the limit theory as a slight bias towards stationarity in the estimated
unit root.
We now provide some heuristic discussion about the capacity of these forward recursive
regression tests to capture the timeline of bubble activity. The tests have discriminatory power
because they are sensitive to the changes that occur when a process undergoes a change from
a unit root to a mildly explosive root or vice versa. This sensitivity is much greater than in
left-sided unit root tests against stationary alternatives, due to the downward bias and long left
tail in the distribution of the autoregressive coeﬃcient in unit root and near stationary cases.
By contrast, as is apparent ex post in the data when there has been a bubble, the trajectories
implied by unit root and mildly explosive processes diﬀer in important ways. Although a unit
root process can generate successive upward movements, these movements still have a random
wandering quality unlike those of a stochastically explosive process where there is a distinct
nonlinearity in movement and little bias in the estimation of the autoregressive coeﬃcient.
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Forward recursive regressions are sensitive to the changes implied by this nonlinearity. When
data from the explosive (bubble) period are included in estimating the autoregressive coeﬃ-
cient, these observations quickly inﬂuence the estimate and its asymptotic behavior due to the
dominating eﬀect of the signal from mildly explosive data. This diﬀerence in signal between
the two periods provides identifying information and explains why the two test procedures
consistently estimate the origination date. When the bubble bursts and the system switches
back to unit root behavior, the signal from the explosive period continues to dominate that of
unit root period. This domination, which at this point is eﬀectively a domination by initial
conditions, is analogous to the domination by distant initializations that can occur in unit root
limit theory, as shown recently by Phillips and Magdalinos (2009). More than this, the crash
and re-initialization give the appearance in the data of a form of mean reversion to an earlier
state, so that the estimated autoregressive coeﬃcient is smaller than unity and the classical
unit root test statistics diverge to minus inﬁnity, as shown in (16) and (17) above.
3 Data
Two datasets are studied in the empirical work reported here. The primary data constitute
seven ﬁnancial time series: the monthly Nasdaq composite price index (without dividends)
over January 1990 to January 2009; the monthly U.S. house price index over January 1987 to
January 2009; the monthly outstanding asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) in the U.S.
over January 2001 to January 2009; monthly crude oil prices (in US dollars) over January
1999 to January 2009; monthly platinum prices (in US dollars) over January 1999 to January
2009; the daily Baa bond rates from January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009; and the weekly
Pound/USD exchange rates from March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009.
A secondary dataset is studied to check whether the empirical bubble characteristics found
in the primary series apply to other commodities and exchange rates. The secondary data
include some commodity prices such as monthly heating oil, coﬀee, cotton, cocoa, sugar, feeder
cattle prices, all measured in USD and over January 1999 to January 2009, and some exchange
rates, such as the weekly Euro/USD exchange rates, the Yen/USD exchange rates and the
Cnd/USD exchange rates, all observed over March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009.
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The choice of the sampling periods is judiciously guided by CFG (2008a) because we aim
to match the empirical analysis with the predictions made in CFG. The CFG story begins with
the internet bubble in the Nasdaq in the 1990s – see page 7 in CFG – and ends with the collapse
of all ﬁnancial bubbles when the economy goes seriously into recession. For the Baa bond rates,
it is well known that a relevant event that signaled the eﬀects of the credit crunch is the failure
of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. The sampling period is chosen so that we have
enough observations before September 15 for the bubble test to have good power. Similar
auguments apply to the choice of the sampling period for the exchange rates. However, other
sampling intervals, all covering the subprime crisis period, have been used and the empirical
ﬁndings reported here are reasonably robust to the choice of the sample period.
The Nasdaq composite price index is obtained from ﬁnance.yahoo.com. It extends the
sample used in PWY by including more recent observations from June 2005 to January 2009.
PWY found strong evidence of a bubble in the Nasdaq during the 1990s, associated with the
dom-com episode. We extend the sample period in order to check whether there are any sub-
sequent bubbles prior to the subprime crisis. The house price index is the seasonally adjusted
S&P Case Shiller composite-10 index obtained from Robert Shiller’s website, and represents
the maximum time span of this data. The outstanding commercial paper data is for asset
backed commercial paper (ABCP) obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. The ABCP time
series is a crude indicator of the size of the mortgage and subprime market. The crude oil price
series is based on WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma spot prices obtained from the Energy Information
Administration website. The platinum price series is obtained from the kitco website. The
Baa bond rates are averages of Baa industrial bond rates and are obtained from the Federal
Reserve Board. This variable measures the credit risk level and is particularly relevant because,
as the crisis unfolded, the sharp drop in the prices and market liquidity of all mortgage-backed
securities led a sharp increase in the price of risk and in spreads. Not surprisingly, mutual
mistrust amongst counterparties surged and bond rates jumped. Finally, the Pound/USD ex-
change rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. For the secondary dataset, all the
commodity prices are downloaded from EconStats (http://www.econstats.com/index.htm) and
all the exchange rates are downloaded from the Federal Reserve Board. All time series, except
for the exchange rates and the Baa bond rates, are deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index
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(CPI), which is obtained from the Department of Labor. Figs. 1-3 plot all of seven series in
the primary dataset. Table 1 reports some summary descriptive statistics for these seven time
series, including sample size, sample frequency, sample minimum, date of the minimum, sample
maximum, date of the maximum, as well as the coeﬃcient statistic (DF δ1 ) and DF-t statistic
(DF t1) based on the entire sample.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Data Sample Freq Min Date Max Date DF δ1 DF
t
1
Size (min) (max)
Nasdaq 432 M 1.1002 Sep 1974 27.66 Jan 2000 -4.6476 -1.5614
House 265 M .4924 Oct 1996 1.1340 Feb 2006 -0.3124 -0.5272
ABCP 97 M 3314.8 Sep 2008 5817.1 July 2007 -2.3631 -1.1098
Oil 121 M .0730 Feb 1999 .6118 June 2008 -3.6298 -1.5713
Platinum 121 M 2.0879 Aug 1999 9.5841 Mar 2008 -3.4287 -1.5088
Baa 772 D 6.08 Dec/21/06 9.54 Oct/31/08 -1.0436 -0.4544
Pound/USD 158 W .4775 Nov/9/07 .7240 Jan/23/09 1.9719 1.0594
The real Nasdaq index reached its maximum of 27.66 in January 2000 growing from a
minimum of 1.1 in September 1974. The house price index troughed in October 1996 and
peaked in February 2006. Interestingly, the minimum value for the ABCP was reached in
September 2008, barely a year after its maximum (July, 2007). This timing suggests a strong
decline in the index over the period August 2007 to September 2008 when the subprime crisis
swept through the mortgage market. The crude oil price and platinum price series follow the
same pattern, having their minima in the early part of the sample and reaching the maxima
in mid-2008. The rate for Baa is lowest (6.81) on December 21, 2006 and highest (9.54)
on October 31, 2008, shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15. The
Pound/USD exchange rate series is volatile, moving rapidly from 0.4775 on November 9, 2007
to 0.7240 on Jan 23, 2009. At the 5% level, for only one series (namely the Pound/USD
exchange rate) is the unit root null rejected in favor of an explosive alternative for the full
sample (the 5% asymptotic critical values are, respectively, -0.13 and -0.07 for the two unit
root test statistics DF δ1 and DF
t
1).
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Hypotheses
Three phases have been identiﬁed in connection with the subprime crisis. According to CFG
(2008a), each phase involves a speciﬁc hypothesis that concerns related bubble activity. In the
ﬁrst phase (A), before the subprime crisis publicly erupted, bubbles had emerged and burst in
the stock market, the housing market, and mortgage market. These bubbles all played a role
in global imbalances. Based on this background, we list the following three hypotheses to be
tested empirically.
Hypothesis A1: A bubble originated and collapsed in the stock market prior to the
emergence of the subprime crisis.
Hypothesis A2: A bubble originated in the housing market following the Nasdaq crash
in late 2000 and burst when the subprime crisis emerged in August 2007.
Hypothesis A3: A bubble originated and collapsed in mortgage market securities, the
collapse coinciding with the public eruption of the subprime crisis in August 2007.
During the second phase (B), the subprime crisis broke and funds ﬂowed selectively to
assets in other markets with lower perceived risk. In consequence, bubbles emerged in certain
commodity and foreign exchange markets and credit risk perceptions shot up. Accordingly, the
following hypothesis are tested.
Hypothesis B1: Bubbles originated in certain commodity price markets and exchange
rates following the eruption of the subprime crisis.
Hypothesis B2: Bubbles originated in the bond market as the subprime crisis unfolded.
In the third phrase (C), as perceptions increased that there would be a potentially serious
impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on real economic activity in the U.S and globally, the ﬁnancial
bubbles in commodity prices and the bond market collapsed. Correspondingly, we have the
hypothesis:
Hypothesis C: Bubbles that had arisen in commodity prices and the bond market col-
lapsed.
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4.2 Empirical Results
We now report and discuss the empirical results. First, we check for statistical evidence of the
presence of bubble(s) in each of the time series based on the recursively calculated sup statistics
maxDF δr and maxDF tr . Table 2 reports critical values for these two statistics obtained by
simulation for the two sample sizes, 100 and 500. The critical values for maxDF tr are nearly
identical to those reported in PWY. The critical values for maxDF δr are about twice as large
as those for maxDF tr . This is not surprising as the critical values for the conventional unit
root statistic DF δr are about twice as large as those for DF tr (see, for example, Fuller, 2000).
Table 2: Critical values of maxDF δr and maxDF tr obtained in simulations
Sample Size Test Statistic 10% 5% 1%
500 maxDF δr 2.3525 2.8791 3.9619
500 maxDF tr 1.1800 1.4603 2.0043
100 maxDF δr 2.3221 2.9470 4.3412
100 maxDF tr 1.1914 1.5073 2.1899
The ﬁrst two rows in Table 3 report values for the two statistics based on the seven time
series with τ0 = 0.1. All cases show overwhelming evidence for the presence of bubbles. The
p-values are all less than 1% for data other than the crude oil price. For the crude oil price, the
p-value is between 1% and 5%. Judging from the magnitude of the two statistics, the bubble
characteristics are strongest in Nasdaq, House prices and Baa.
Table 3: Testing the Presence of Bubbles and Date Stamping2
Nasdaq Home Price ABCP Oil Platinum Baa Pnd/USD
maxDF δr 18.026 5.7668 4.5963 4.2131 5.063 19.156 7.5524
maxDF tr 8.2106 14.625 4.9612 2.3652 2.565 5.1876 2.6286
τ̂e June/95 Jan/01 Nov/05 Mar/08 Jan/08 Oct/8/08 Oct/31/08
τ̂f Nov/95 Aug/07 Aug/07 Aug/08 July/08 Dec/4/08 NA
Next we estimate the origination and collapse dates, τe and τf . Time series plots of the
recursively calculated statistics DF δr and DF
t
r are shown in Figs. 5-11. Superposed on these
plots are the critical value paths, log log2 [nr] /2, log log2 [nr] /4, the estimated dates τ̂e, τ̂f , and
2The reported estimated τe and τf are based on DF
δ
t .
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the onset date for the subprime crisis. Recall that Figs. 1-3 plot τ̂e and τ̂f , together with the
time series data. In all of these cases, we clearly identify an explosive subperiod in the data.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the estimates and Figs. 1–3 and 5-11. First,
the estimated origination and collapse dates seem to cover a subperiod of signiﬁcant price
run-up in each of the time series. Second, the estimated origination dates are not the same
as the apparent beginning of these run-up periods. This may be because a unit root process
as well as processes with very mildly explosive roots that are closer to unity than an O
(
n−1
)
neighborhood can also generate mild run-ups but the latter are indistinguishable from a unit
root root process. The present tests have discriminatory power for mildly explosive roots
beyond those of O
(
n−1
)
neighborhoods. Third, both statistics DF δr and DF tr lead to the same
or very similar dating estimates, except for house prices, which are discussed below.
Some speciﬁc conclusions can be drawn for the individual time series and these are sum-
marized below.
1. For the Nasdaq series, a very signiﬁcant bubble is found by both DF δr and DF
t
r statistics
over June 1995 to Oct 2000. The estimates τ̂e and τ̂f are identical to those found in
PWY, although a diﬀerent statistic (the augmented Dickey-Fuller test) was employed
there, the data sources (both for the index and the deﬂator) diﬀer, and the sample period
is shorter in PWY. Interestingly, no bubble is found over the more recent period even
there was some run up in prices before the subprime crisis. Note that the Nasdaq bubble
collapsed several years prior to the subprime crisis. So the results are entirely consistent
with hypothesis A1.
2. For the House Price series, again a very signiﬁcant bubble is found by both DF δr and
DF tr , but this time during the 2000s. Compared with DF tr , the statistic DF δr is six
months later in identifying the bubble but six months earlier identifying the collapse of
the bubble. Also, DF tr identiﬁes another bubble period earlier in the data (September
1992 - October 1997) whereas DF δr suggests this period is not a bubble period. In both
cases, our estimates of the bubble origination date in the early 2000s strongly support
the argument in Baker (2002), who claimed that there was a housing bubble at the time.
According to DF δr , the bubble collapsed in August 2007 when the subprime crisis erupted,
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consistent with hypothesis A2.
3. For the ABCP series, a signiﬁcant bubble is found by both DF δr and DF tr over November
2005 to July 2008. Note that in this case the origination date τ̂e comes several years
later than that of the House Price series, reﬂecting the lag in packaging mortgages into
ﬁnancial derivatives and related products. The bubble collapsed in August 2007 when
the subprime crisis became apparent, consistent with hypothesis A3.
4. For Crude Oil prices, neither DF δr nor DF tr identiﬁes a bubble before the subprime crisis
broke out. However, a signiﬁcant bubble is found by both DF δr and DF
t
r over March
2008 to July 2008. The bubble emerged in March 2008 after the subprime crisis broke,
consistent with hypothesis B1. The bubble collapsed in August 2008, consistent with
hypothesis C.
5. For Platinum prices, the recursions of DF δr and DF tr both include two periods (one
at the beginning of the sample and the other in the middle of the sample) where the
statistics exceed the critical values. However, the durations are so short so that the log(n)
separating rule for minimum bubble duration suggests that these should be interpreted
as short-lived run-ups not bubbles. However, a signiﬁcant bubble is found by both DF δr
and DF tr over January 2008 to June 2008. The bubble emerged in January 2008 after
the subprime crisis broke, consistent with hypothesis B1. The bubble collapsed in July
2008, consistent with hypothesis C.
6. For the Baa bond rates, while both DF δr and DF
t
r suggest random wandering behavior
for much of the period, both also indicate a short but signiﬁcant bubble over the period
from October 18, 2008 to December 3, 2008. This period corresponds with the period of
the rapid acceleration of ﬁnancial distress, soon after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
The bubble emerged in the bond market on October 8, 2008 after the subprime crisis
erupted, consistent with hypotheses B2 and C.
7. Finally, for the Pound/USD exchange rate, a signiﬁcant bubble is found by both DF δr
and DF tr . The bubble emerged on October 31, 2008 after the subprime crisis, consistent
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Figure 5: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the real Nasdaq index
from February 1973 to January 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
with hypothesis C. However, the bubble persists until the end of our sample, March 20,
2009 and remains an ongoing characteristic in the data.
In sum, all these tests provide empirical support for hypotheses A - C, showing bubble
characteristics in the data that are consistent with the hypotheses. The empirical estimates on
the timeline of the crisis also broadly support the predictions made in the CFG (2008a) model.
Fig. 12 shows the complete timeline of the bubble process. The timeline shows how bubbles
migrated from the equity market (in particular the Nasdaq index), ﬁrst to the housing market,
and next to the mortgage market before the subprime crisis. After the subprime crisis, the
bubbles selectively moved to certain goods in commodity markets and certain currencies in the
foreign exchange market.
To assess whether or not bubble characteristics were a generic or speciﬁc feature in com-
modity and foreign exchange markets during the ﬁnancial crisis, we applied the methods more
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Figure 6: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the real seasonally
adjusted home price composite 10 index from January 1987 to January 2009, obtained from
forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 7: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the real outstanding
values for asset-backed commercial paper from January 2001 to January 2009, obtained from
forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 8: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the real crude oil price
from January 1999 to January 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 9: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the real platinum price
from January 1999 to January 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 10: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the Baa bond rates
from January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 11: Recursive calculation of the coeﬃcient test and t statistic for the Pound/USD
exchange rates March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 12: Timeline of ﬁnancial bubbles in the stock, real estate, commodity, bond, and foreign
exchange markets. The panels show recursive calculations of the coeﬃcient statistic and critical
values highlighting the successive bubble episodes.
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broadly to many series in a secondary dataset. To preserve space, we present only the summary
empirical results in Table 4 without plotting the recursive test statistics.
Although it is clear from the empirical results obtained earlier that funds moved across
markets during the crisis period for ﬂight-to-quality and ﬂight-to-liquidity reasons, the results
in Table 4 suggest that investors were selective in transferring assets. For example, in the
commodity market, we identify a bubble in heating oil prices, with similar origination and
collapsing dates as those for crude oil prices. However, we ﬁnd no evidence of bubbles in
coﬀee, cotton, sugar, and feeder cattle prices. In the foreign exchange market, we locate a
bubble in the Cnd/USD exchange rate, which originated on September 21, 2007 and burst on
November 23, 2007. Interestingly, the origination date is about one year earlier than that
in the Pound/USD exchange rate. However, no bubble is found in the Euro/USD exchange
rate. Although the value of the maxDF δr statistic is marginally higher than the corresponding
critical value for Cocoa and the Yen/USD rate, detailed analysis of the recursive calculations
of the test statistic shows that the run-ups only lasted for a couple of periods and therefore do
not survive the log(n) separating rule for minimum bubble duration.
Table 4: Test Results for the Presence of Bubbles and Date Stamps
maxDF δr maxDF
t
r τ̂e τ̂f
Heating oil 6.9092 2.2416 March/08 August/08
Coﬀee -1.6035 -0.7002 NA NA
Cotton -0.2466 -0.0866 NA NA
Cocoa 2.4876 0.9872 NA NA
Sugar -0.7408 -0.2220 NA NA
Feeder cattle 1.0336 0.4327 NA NA
Euro/USD 0.4091 0.3311 NA NA
Yen/USD 3.8949 1.4247 NA NA
Cnd/USD 4.0494 2.6956 Sep/21/07 Nov/23/07
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical study of the bubble characteristics in several key ﬁnancial
variables over an historical time period that includes the subprime crisis and its sequel, in-
cluding global eﬀects. The econometric methods employed are based on recursive regression,
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right-sided unit root tests and a newly developed dating technology and associated limit theory
from Phillips and Yu (2009). These methods enable us to track the timeline of the crisis in
terms of the individual series by empirically dating the origination and collapse of each of the
bubbles. The dates are matched against the onset date for the subprime crisis as well as a
speciﬁc sequential hypothesis concerning bubble migrations that are predicted in the theoret-
ical model proposed by CFG (2008a). Our estimates suggest that bubbles migrated from the
equity market to the housing market and on to the subprime mortgage derivative market before
the crisis broke. After the crisis erupted into the public arena, the pricing bubbles migrated
to selected commodity markets and, in some cases, the foreign exchange market, suggesting a
ﬂight-to-quality or perceived safe haven phenomena. All these bubbles collapsed as the ﬁnan-
cial crisis impacted real economic activity. The estimated sequence of the bubble migration
phenomenon is broadly consistent with the predictions of CFG (2008a).
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